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CORPORATE WRONGDOING: INTERACTIONS OF  
LEGAL MANDATES AND CORPORATE CULTURE 
 




In recent years, enforcement officials have imposed billions of 
dollars in sanctions on all major U.S. financial institutions and many 
major financial institutions abroad. Similar sanctions have been 
imposed on nonfinancial institutions. The sanctions are the result of 
findings of recurrent violations of law, as well as recidivism. Why have 
existing regulatory standards and enforcement policies led to repeated 
violations of law? Will the recent billion dollar sanctions deter future 
wrongdoing?  
This article explores these issues by examining the philosophy 
motivating regulatory policy and action in the United States and 
United Kingdom, using financial regulators as a case study. This 
article discusses the interaction between two institutions that influence 
corporate actors: government and corporate culture. That interaction 
is examined through the lens of behavioral decision theory and 
complexity theory. This article draws the conclusion that regulators in 
the United States continue to be blind to cognitive influences on 
corporate behavior. Enforcement policy in the United States has 
ignored the multiple influences on corporate behavior that interact 
and lead to nonlinear outcomes. The only change made in U.S. 
enforcement strategy, if any, has been a greater emphasis on large 
penalties to deter future misconduct. This emphasis continues to reflect 
a linear, reductionist view of corporate behavior. By contrast, 
regulators in the United Kingdom have begun to recognize cognitive 
influences, and are rethinking their enforcement strategy based, in 
part, on recognition of multiple influences on corporate decision-
making. U.S. enforcement policy’s regulatory blindness appears likely 
to lead to recurring issues of noncompliance. 
 
                                                      
* Vincent Di Lorenzo is a Professor of Law at St. John’s University School of 
Law, and Senior Research Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society 
at St. John’s University.  
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Reports of violations of legal standards by mainstream 
corporations crowd the news media. These reports document recurrent 
violations of legal standards and recidivist corporate behavior.1 In 
some industries, such as the financial services industry, legal violations 
occur across large segments of the industry.2 Enforcement officials 
have imposed billions of dollars in sanctions against all the major U.S. 
financial institutions and many major financial institutions abroad.3 
The large sanctions are the result of findings of recurrent violations of 
law as well as recidivism.4 Why have existing regulatory standards and 
enforcement policies led to repeated violations of law? Will the recent 
                                                      
1 See infra Part II.C. 
2 See infra Part II.C. 
3 See infra Part III.B.3. 
4 See generally Gretchen Morgenson, At Big Banks, A Lesson Not Learned, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/ 
business/at-big-banks-a-lesson-not-learned.html [https://perma.cc/2Z6Q-
SFVR]. 
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billion dollar sanctions deter future wrongdoing? This article explores 
these issues by examining the philosophy motivating regulatory policy 
and action on the part of financial regulators in the United States and 
United Kingdom.  
Regulatory philosophy in the United States and United 
Kingdom long reflected an assumption of corporate commitment to 
law-abiding behavior.5 Mainstream corporations were viewed as 
embracing an ethical obligation to comply with legal mandates.6 The 
result was a light-touch approach to enforcement policy—a policy 
relying on agreements to cease violations and not emphasizing the 
imposition of civil penalties.7 When law-abiding behavior was absent 
and a breach of legal standards was substantial, recurrent, or systemic, 
only then were financial penalties imposed.8 More recently, regulatory 
philosophy has been modified to embrace the view that corporate 
actors are rational decision makers, choosing to comply with, evade, or 
violate legal obligations based on cost-benefit evaluations.9 This 
regulatory philosophy reflects a neoclassical economic view of cost-
benefit evaluations, under which it is assumed that corporate actors 
will comply with legal requirements if all potential costs of 
noncompliance exceed its benefits.10 In this scenario it is assumed that 
corporate actors assess risk based on a full appreciation of all the short-
term and long-term consequences of their actions. The related 
assumption is that corporate decisions are linear in nature, so that 
increasing the size of fines, for example, will have a direct and 
proportional impact on future decisions concerning legal compliance.11 
This is both a reductionist and a linear view of human decision 
making. The 2008 financial crisis has revealed flaws in both of these 
viewpoints.12 This article applies decision theory and complexity 
theory to explore why increased sanctions alone will likely not deter 
                                                      
5 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19–20 (1992); cf. infra note 212 
and accompanying text.  
6 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
7 See id.; infra Part II.A–II.B.  
8 See Margaret Cole, The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?, 12 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 266, 270 (2007); infra Part II.C. 
9 See infra Part II.A. 
10 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECO. 169, 177 (1968); infra Part II.B. 
11 See infra note 299 and accompanying text.  
12 See infra Part II.C. 
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future corporate misconduct. Specifically, it explores the multiple 
influences on corporate decision making. These influences include: 
reason, reflected in cost-benefit evaluations; internal and external 
market conditions; cognitive influences on decision making, including 
the role of decision-making heuristics; and other influences such as 
firm or industry corporate culture.13 This article also explores the 
interaction of various influences on corporate behavior resulting in 
nonlinear outcomes, and the likely effect of a heightened level of fines 
on corporate behavior as this factor interacts with other influences on 
future corporate decisions.14  
Following this Introduction, Part II of this article examines the 
assumptions of law-abiding behavior and rational decision making in 
past formulations of regulatory standards and enforcement policy in 
the United States and United Kingdom. The actions and policies of 
financial services regulators provide a case study.15 In the 1970s and 
1980s the academic community began to reject a reductionist view of 
individual, consumer decision making, and later of corporate decision 
making—a reductionist view that assumed compliance decisions were 
determined solely by ethical commitment to law-abiding behavior and 
later solely by reason.16 Market experience confirmed academic 
criticisms; regulators, however, did not embrace this change in 
viewpoint.17 Instead, regulatory authorities in the United States and 
United Kingdom for many years, continued to base regulatory 
standards and enforcement policy on a general assumption of 
commitment to law-abiding behavior by mainstream corporations, 
with outliers reined in through monetary sanctions.18 In recent years, 
regulatory philosophy was modified to reflect the role of reason in 
corporate compliance decisions.19 This regulatory philosophy assumes 
full recognition of all long-term and short-term risks of misconduct by 
corporate actors. The heightened reliance on financial penalties to 
                                                      
13 See infra Part III.B.1–III.B.2.  
14 See infra Part III.B.3.  
15 See infra Part II.A. 
16 See generally Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law 
Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis, 59 FORD. L. REV. S155, S156 
(1991). 
17 See infra Part II.B.  
18 Niel Willardson & Jackie Brunmeier, Types of Enforcement Actions, THE 
REGION (Sept. 1, 2006), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-
region/types-of-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/J6HE-LUWP]; see 
infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
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deter future misconduct reflects this change. Nonetheless, regulatory 
authorities in the United States remain blind to the multiple influences 
on corporate decisions, including the effect of cognitive influences and 
heuristics on cost-benefit evaluations, and more generally on 
organizational behavior.20 
Part III explores evidence that corporate decisions are 
determined by multiple interacting influences. Government as an 
institution, reflected in legal standards and enforcement policy and 
actions, is one influence.21 Accepted business models, cognitive 
factors, and behavioral tendencies are components of corporate culture 
as an institution, and also play an important role in shaping corporate 
decisions.22 Such influences interact in a dynamic system in which 
outcomes are nonlinear. As a result, nongovernmental influences can 
and have become dominant influences, overshadowing directives in 
law and the influence of higher fines and similar sanctions.23 
Regulatory agencies in the United States have largely ignored these 
nongovernmental influences in shaping regulatory policy. The change, 
if any, in U.S. enforcement strategy is rather a greater emphasis on 
large penalties to deter future misconduct, which continues to reflect a 
linear, reductionist view of corporate behavior. This regulatory 
blindness seems likely to lead recurring issues of noncompliance.24 In 
contrast, regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom are rethinking 
their enforcement strategy based, in part, on recognition of multiple 





20 See infra Part III.A. 
21 Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law as a Determinant of Business 
Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 288 (2007); see infra Part III.B.1–III.B.2.  
22 See generally Di Lorenzo, supra note 21. 
23 See generally id. 
24 See infra Part III.B.3. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with 
JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic 
Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1237.html 
[https://perma.cc/4JZH-2S4D].  
25 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ENFORCEMENT FINANCIAL PENALTIES 5 (2009) 
(UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7ZM-
S2NL]; infra Part III.B.4.  
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II. Traditional Regulatory Philosophy 
 
The academic literature has explored and debated the proper 
goal of regulatory enforcement policy—whether it is restitution, 
deterrence, and/or retribution.26 It has also examined individual 
influences on corporate commitment to legal compliance.27 Scholarly 
debate has focused on the cognitive and behavioral influences on 
human decision making, but the debate has focused on consumer 
decision making.28 Less attention has been paid to cognitive influences 
on organizational behavior.29 More importantly, the academic 
literature has largely ignored whether regulators have recognized 
cognitive influences on organizational behavior. This article explores 
this issue, and examines the changes in regulatory philosophy that are 
necessary to induce greater corporate commitment to legal 
compliance. 
 
A. The Law-Abiding Decision Maker 
 
The traditional view of regulatory agencies in the financial 
services industry was that industry members were committed to legal 
compliance.30 Noncompliance was viewed as limited to situations 
                                                      
26 See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 853 (2012) and articles cited therein. 
27 See Tomas R. Giberson et al., Leadership and Organizational Culture: 
Linking CEO Characteristics to Cultural Values, 24 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 123, 
123–37 (June 2009). 
28 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–81 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin, 
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 23, 43–56 (2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075–102 (2000); DAVID DE MEZA ET AL., 
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 
PERSPECTIVE (2008) (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/ 
research/fsa-crpr69.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TV-N2WG] (discussing cognitive 
biases identified in behavioral economics as they relate to a national strategy 
for better financial capability among the population of the United Kingdom). 
29 See infra notes 205–12 and accompanying text (discussing various 
cognitive influences on legal compliance). 
30 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 19–20 (describing most 
regulators as being in the compliance camp—namely, that “most corporate 
actors will comply with the law most of the time simply because it is the law 
. . .” and embracing that viewpoint). 
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involving rogue organizations or individuals, or occasional negligent 
wrongdoing.31 Both regulatory requirements and enforcement policy 
reflected this viewpoint.32 The American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance reflect this perspective.33 Section 2.01 
recognizes that a corporation should have as “its objective the conduct 
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.”34 However, “[e]ven if corporate profit and 
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation . . . [i]s 
obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the 
boundaries set by law . . . .” 35 This obligation to comply with the law 
did not depend on cost-benefit evaluations.36 Section 2.01 was first 
tentatively approved in 1984.37 Its objective was accepted by financial 
services regulators.38 
For example, in 1983 the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency 
declined to impose explicit limitations on national banks’ real estate 
lending activities, and rescinded then-current regulations that did 
impose precise limits.39 This decision constrained industry-lending 
practices solely by the general principles that unsafe and unsound 
banking practices must be avoided and that underwriting practices 
must be prudent.40 This principles-based approach relied on bank 
management to determine which practices did not meet the safety and 
soundness and prudence principles.41 The Comptroller justified this 
decision on the following grounds: 
 
                                                      
31 Id. at 26. 
32 Id. at 21. 
33 See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6.  
34 Id. at § 2.01(a). 
35 Id. at § 2.01(b)(1). 
36 Id. at § 2.01 cmt. g (“Cost-benefit analysis may have a place in the state’s 
determination whether a given type of conduct should be deemed legally 
wrongful. Once that determination has been made, however, the resulting 
legal rule normally represents a community decision that the conduct is 
wrongful as such, so that cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the rule is out 
of place.”) 
37 See Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of 
the ALI’s Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984). 
38 Id. at 512. 
39 Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,699–700 
(Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7). 
40 Id. at 40,700. 
41 Id. 
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[T]he Office believes that, in the interest of 
facilitating national banks’ ability to respond to 
market conditions, removal of the restrictions is 
warranted. . . . Decisions concerning the forms and 
terms of national bank lending are properly the 
responsibility of each bank’s directorate and 
management.42 
 
Implicit in this approach was a view that mainstream financial 
institutions were law-abiding actors and therefore would be committed 
to legislative and regulatory mandates that imposed constraints in the 
form of general principles.43 A similar principles-based approach to 
regulation, and similar view of banking corporations as law-abiding 
citizens, was embraced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 
the United Kingdom.44 
Based on the viewpoint of a law-abiding corporate actor, 
enforcement policy responded to most violations through what has 
been termed a light-touch approach.45 Under this approach, when a 
violation was uncovered, the offender was required to agree to refrain 
from further violations of law.46 Substantial fines or other sanctions 
were not thought necessary to ensure future compliance on the part of 
most industry members, including most violators, due to the 
assumption that a law-abiding culture characterized most 
organizations.47 
                                                      
42 Id. at 40,699. 
43 Id. 
44 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE 
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 4 (2007) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/other/principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD7Y-WRJZ] (“We want to give 
firms the responsibility to decide how best to align their business objectives 
and processes with the regulatory outcomes we have specified . . . . Principles-
based regulation is not new . . . . However we see real benefits for firms, 
markets and consumers . . . in tipping the balance of our approach towards a 
greater reliance on principles . . . .”). 
45 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATOR RESPONSE TO THE 
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 88 (2009) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
other/turner_review.pdf [https://perma.cc/39E6-4HGN]. 
46 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FSA’S ROLE UNDER THE PAYMENT SERVICES 
REGULATIONS 2009: OUR APPROACH 123–25 (2012) (UK), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/archive/fsa-psd-approach-latest.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VND-JEE6]. 
47 See Cole, supra note 8, at 270. 
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For example, the enforcement policy of U.S. federal bank 
regulators has relied on informal agreements, formal agreements, and 
cease and desist orders when regulators encountered examples of 
noncompliance with legal mandates.48 Under this policy, when firms 
failed to comply with legal mandates they faced an agreement or order 
to cease the activities in question.49 Firms did not face fines for past 
violations and, in fact, typically retained all the profits earned through 
past practices conducted in violation of legal mandates.50  
U.S. federal banking regulators’ actions in response to 
examinations revealing unsafe or unfair mortgage lending activities 
before the 2008 mortgage crisis provide a revealing case study. Federal 
banking regulators rarely brought supervisory actions to address unfair 
or unsafe mortgage lending practices.51 When an agency encountered 
any legal violation, usually the only enforcement measure taken would 
be an agreement with or order against an individual bank to stop 
unsafe or unsound practices.52 When regulators would bring 
                                                      
48 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, PPM 5310-3, OCC POLICIES & PROCEDURE MANUAL 4–7 (2011). 
49 Id. at 5. 
50 Willardson & Brunmeier, supra note 18. 
51 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative 
Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 95–98 (2012). 
52 See Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor 
Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 
64–68 (2009) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency) 
[hereinafter Dugan] (stating that most bank problems are resolved through the 
supervisory process, without resort to an enforcement action, and that 
enforcement actions, whether informal or formal, typically involve an 
agreement or order to cease the unsafe or unsound practice with relatively few 
civil money penalties being imposed against the banks). See also Willardson 
& Brunmeier, supra note 18, for a description of the types of enforcement 
actions utilized by the federal banking agencies. Regulatory actions related to 
the mortgage crisis exemplify this light-touch approach. See Todd Davenport, 
OCC’s New Predator Rule, AM. BANKER (Feb. 3, 2005), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/170_24/-241453-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZW6U-AYHT] (explaining how the OCC defines anti-
predatory lending standards as a safety and soundness issue, and enforces 
violations through a deficiency letter or in an examination report first, 
followed by a safety-and-soundness order, the equivalent of a cease and desist 
order, and lastly, for failure to comply, possible civil money penalties); Greg 
Ip & Damian Paletta, Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117449440555444249 
[https://perma.cc/G58J-TTJJ] (observing that federal banking agencies had 
issued relatively few public disciplinary actions in the two years preceding the 
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enforcement actions, such actions typically involved a written 
agreement to correct past violations and, occasionally, a cease and 
desist order.53 Both written agreements and cease and desist orders 
merely outline corrective actions a financial institution’s management 
and directors must take to address deficiencies in the institution’s 
operations.54 
This light-touch approach to enforcement by U.S. banking 
agencies is also reflected in the “deferred prosecution agreement” and 
“non-prosecution agreement” policies of the U.S. Justice Department 
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).55 In such 
agreements, no actions are commenced if firms investigate their own 
past wrongdoing and promise to change their behavior.56 In fact, this 
policy became the official policy of the Justice Department in 2008, 
just as the financial crisis unfolded.57 
In the United Kingdom, the FSA had embraced a similar, 
light-touch enforcement policy for when noncompliance with legal 
                                                                                                                   
article’s publication, and that most discipline was in the form of cease-and-
desist orders). Civil money penalties are available in addition to supervisory 
actions and cease and desist orders, but are rarely imposed for consumer 
violations generally, let alone for unfair mortgage practices specifically. Neil 
Willardson & Jackie Brunmeier, Supervisory Enforcement Actions Since 
FIRREA and FDICIA, THE REGION (Sept. 1, 2006), https://www. 
minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/supervisory-enforcement-actions-
since-firrea-and-fdicia [https://perma.cc/2YF5-DC29] (observing that between 
1999 and 2005 U.S. bank regulators issued only one civil monetary penalty 
attributable to consumer protection weaknesses). 
53 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 97. 
54 See Willardson & Brumeier, supra note 18 (discussing trends in civil 
monetary penalties between 1989 and 2005 and finding that 1 percent of all 
civil money penalties imposed between 1999 and 2005 were based on 
consumer protection violations, while enforcement activity was most heavily 
concentrated on cease and desist orders and written agreements). 
55 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark Filip to Heads of 
Dept. Components U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/RF2E-EL4X]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION PROGRAM (2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
enfcoopinitiative.shtml [https://perma.cc/RH4E-DXHR]. 
56 Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Policies Itself, 




57 See id. 
2016-2017 CORPORATE WRONGDOING 217 
 
requirements was uncovered.58 Namely, the FSA’s policy provided 
that when a firm acted promptly in taking remedial action agreed to 
with its supervisors, the FSA could decide against taking formal 
disciplinary action.59 If the firm did not act promptly, then FSA would 
take disciplinary or other enforcement action.60 
The light-touch approach in enforcement policy seemed 
reasonable in an era in which regulatory policy assumed a law-abiding 
corporate culture. The regulators’ primary roles were to (1) spot 
violations of law, which were presumed to occur inadvertently or, 
perhaps, through uncertainty arising from legal mandates that were in 
the form of general principles, (2) bring the violations to the 
corporation’s attention, and (3) secure a promise of future compliance. 
These roles would, and should continue to, evolve as the assumptions 
underlying corporate behaviors changed.  
 
B. The Rational Decision Maker 
 
To some degree, the assumption of the law-abiding corporate 
actor was being reconsidered as early as 1989.61 For example, in 
response to the savings and loan crisis, the U.S. Congress significantly 
increased the level of permissible civil penalties that banking 
regulators could impose.62 When faced with repeated violations of law, 
or significant and systemic violations, regulators did impose large 
monetary sanctions, including civil penalties.63 When they did so, 
regulatory policy assumed that substantial penalties would help to 
deter further misconduct.64 However, deterrence was not the primary 
aim of the sanctions imposed.65 Rather, monetary sanctions sought 
                                                      
58 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE ENFORCEMENT GUIDE 5 (2009) (UK), 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/document/EG_20091101_20100
305.pdf?date=2009-12-06 [https://perma.cc/Y6UK-AQFG]. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. 101-73, § 907(a) 103 Stat. 183, 462–63 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1818(i)(2)). 
62 See id. (explaining that the former fine of $1,000 per day was modified to 
provide for first-tier penalties of up to $5,000 per day, second-tier penalties of 
up to $25,000 per day, and third-tier penalties of up to $1 million per day). 
63 See Dugan, supra note 52, at 68–71. 
64 See id. at 68. 
65 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC, N.Y. Attorney General, 
NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement 
to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes 
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primarily to provide restitution, and, at times, to fund structural 
changes in the industry.66 Nonetheless, regulators continued to rely 
primarily on a light-touch approach to enforcement until the outbreak 
of the 2008 mortgage crisis.67 
The regulatory assumption of corporate ethical commitment to 
law-abiding behavior was brought into question by market experience 
in the 1980s and 1990s.68 Government estimates of the number of 
savings and loan failures in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s 
that were caused by insider fraud ranged from 25 to 40 percent.69 
Some wrongdoing was criminal, as 1,100 criminal prosecutions of 
individuals involved in major savings and loan fraud resulted in 839 
convictions.70 Yet, financial regulators have exhibited sustained path 
dependence. Apart from actions related to the savings and loan crisis, a 
light-touch approach to regulation persisted, in spite of the wrongdoing 
that led to the mortgage crisis of 2008.71  
It is useful to compare the regulatory philosophy reflected in 
regulators’ statements accompanying the 2002 industry-wide 
settlements regarding the improper activities of research analysts in 
investment banking firms, with the more recent statements 
accompanying settlements made between 2012 and 2015. The 2002 
settlements highlighted the structural changes in the industry as the 
means to ensure future legal compliance.72 The main goals of the $1.4 
billion monetary sanctions imposed in 2002 were to provide restitution 
to investors and to fund some of the structural changes that would help 
ensure future compliance with legal mandates.73 Contrary to what 
                                                                                                                   
Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2002-179.htm. [https://perma.cc/6GJU-3BSX]. 
66 Id. 
67 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the light-touch 
approach to enforcement). 
68 See Green, supra note 16, at S156. 
69 See id. at S162–S163 
70 Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the 
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2011/04/14/business/20110414-prosecute.html 
[https://perma.cc/4K4D-CCNU]. 
71 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (detailing the regulatory approach 
leading up to the financial crisis). 
72 See William H. Donaldson, Speech by Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Chairman: 
Prepared for Delivery at SEC Press Conference Regarding Global Settlement 
(Apr. 28, 2003), www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803whd.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/8R32-VL8N]. 
73 Id. 
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might be assumed, deterrence of future wrongdoing was not, in fact, 
emphasized as the purpose of the monetary sanctions.74 This reflects a 
regulatory philosophy that continued to be shaped by the assumption 
of a law-abiding corporate culture in the industry generally. 
 By contrast, in recent settlements U.S. regulators have 
emphasized the expectation of a deterrent effect produced by 
significant monetary sanctions.75 The sanctions seek to deter not only 
the violator, but also other members of the industry.76 Accordingly, 
while restitution remains a regulatory goal,77 deterrence has become an 
equally important goal.78  
The increased emphasis on deterrence reflects two underlying 
changes in regulatory philosophy. One change is a rejection of the 
assumption of a law-abiding corporate culture.79 Regulators now 
recognize that corporations comply with, evade, or decide to violate 
legal mandates based on cost-benefit evaluations.80 Commitment to 
legal compliance will not be robust if the benefits of noncompliance 
exceed its costs.81 This evaluation system reflects a view that the 
decisions of corporate actors are entirely, or at least primarily, 
determined by reason. Regulators have embraced the view that the 
corporate actor will appreciate and weigh all the long-term and short-
term risks and benefits of a proposed course of action.82  
Such a viewpoint ignores, among other influences, cognitive 
influences on evaluation of risks and benefits. It also ignores the 
concept of complexity, including the multiple influences on human 
                                                      
74 See id. (“[A]lthough the monetary relief secured in the settlement is 
substantial . . . the losses that investors suffered . . . far exceeds the ability to 
compensate them fully . . . . [T]he structural reforms required are, in my view, 
more significant.”); Press Release, supra note 65. 
75 See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing expected deterrent 
effects of penalties imposed). 
76 See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing how the financial 
penalties imposed are intended to deter other companies). 
77 See Donaldson, supra note 72.  
78 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.  
79 See infra note 297 and accompanying text (suggesting that one bank’s 
criminal actions are potentially indicative of other corporate banks). 
80 See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing one bank’s conscious 
decision to commit thousands of violations despite many opportunities to 
adhere to regulations).  
81 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 44, at 2. The type of rational decision 
making assumed to exist is cost-benefit evaluations in neoclassical economic 
terms. See Becker, supra note 10, at 177. 
82 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 44, at 10–13.  
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behavior that interact to shape decisions.83 Instead, U.S. regulatory 
philosophy continues to reflect a reductionist and linear view of human 
decision making. Curiously, when U.S. financial regulators embraced 
the view that corporate compliance decisions are influenced by cost-
benefit evaluations, they ignored the academic studies and market 
evidence that called into question the neoclassical economic view of 
cost-benefit evaluations. They ignored the evidence that had led to the 
rise of behavioral decision theory.  
 
C. The Outcome: Recurrent and Recidivist 
Corporate Behavior 
 
 Corporate actions in the financial services industry have 
exhibited recurrent violations of law and recidivist behavior. First, 
individual financial institutions have violated repeatedly particular 
laws over extended periods of time,84 while others have violated 
numerous legal standards.85 Second, numerous members of the 
financial services industry have simultaneously violated laws.86 In 
some cases, the wrongdoing appears to have become systemic.87 Third, 
                                                      
83 Complexity theory recognizes that an effect is often not the product of one 
constant cause. Rather, it results from the interaction of many forces that are 
constantly changing. Therefore, the existence and influence of each force is 
not constant. See GREGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING 
COMPLEXITY 6 (W.H. Freeman & Co. ed., 1989); Donald T. Hornstein, 
Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 913, 
917–18 (2005) (defining complexity theory as “the study of many actors and 
their interactions”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 110, 113–14 (1991) (applying the concept of complexity to the 
interaction of the multiple justices on the U.S. Supreme Court); J.B Ruhl & 
Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States, 30 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 417–18 (1997) (explaining that complexity theory’s 
main properties consist of “the behavior of a system” described “according to 
the community of its components . . . , mechanics of evolution in the system 
. . . [and] overall direction of change”). 
84 See Michael Corkery, Finra Fines Citigroup Over Acts by Analysts, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 24, 2014, 1:20 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/citigroup-fined-15-million-for-
failing-to-properly-supervise-analysts/ [https://perma.cc/8N92-AF34]. 
85 Green, supra note 16; see also Morgenson, supra note 4 (discussing several 
financial institutions’ violation of the same FINRA regulation while bidding 
on the Toys “R” Us IPO). 
86 See Morgenson, supra note 4. 
87 Id. 
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industry members have demonstrated recidivist behavior by repeating 
violations after being subject to significant sanctions, or failing to 
comply with the terms of earlier settlements.88 
 There are many recent examples of recurrent violations of law. 
In 2012, HSBC admitted to violations of both money laundering laws 
and laws prohibiting the transfer of funds for countries subject to U.S. 
economic sanctions.89 These violations occurred from 2006 to 2010.90 
HSBC agreed to forfeit $1.256 billion and to pay $665 million in civil 
penalties.91 Assistant Attorney General Breuer noted that “[t]he record 
of dysfunction that prevailed at HSBC for many years was 
astonishing.” 92 Also in 2012, British bank Standard Chartered settled 
with the Justice Department and other regulators for violations of U.S. 
laws prohibiting transfer of funds for countries subject to U.S. 
economic sanctions.93 The violations occurred over a period of years.94 
The Justice Department described the violations as deliberate and 
flagrant, and the bank had also made misleading statements to 
regulators to conceal its misconduct.95 It agreed to pay $227 million, 
and the settlement required it to remediate anti-money-laundering 
compliance problems.96 At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board 
assessed a civil penalty of $100 million against Standard Chartered, 
and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
announced a $132 million settlement with Standard Chartered based 
                                                      
88 See id. (discussing the $43.5 million settlement of 10 financial firms for the 
violation of FINRA’s research rules in 2014, many of which were part of a 
similar settlement in 2003 for the same violation of FINRA’s research rules). 
89 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank 
USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, 







93 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Standard Chartered Bank Agrees to 
Forfeit $227 Million for Illegal Transactions With Iran, Sudan, Libya and 
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on the same violations.97 Standard Chartered agreed to pay an 
additional $300 million fine in August 2014 to the New York State 
Department of Financial Services for continuing deficiencies in its 
computer systems that “failed to flag wire transfers from parts of the 
world considered vulnerable to money laundering.”98 
Then, in 2013, Royal Bank of Scotland settled with U.S. 
regulators for violating U.S. laws imposing economic sanctions and 
agreed to pay $100 million.99 The bank concealed the identities of 
clients in at least 3500 transactions with the knowledge of senior 
employees, including the heads of money laundering and global 
banking services for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.100 
BNP Paribas settled with the Justice Department in 2014 for 
violating U.S. laws prohibiting the transfer of funds for countries 
subject to U.S. economic sanctions.101 The violations occurred from at 
least 2004 through 2012, and BNP Paribas went to elaborate lengths to 
conceal prohibited transactions and deceive U.S. authorities.102  
Most recently, in 2015 Crédit Agricole agreed to sanctions 
totaling more than $787.3 million to settle charges brought by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office of the District of Columbia, the Federal Reserve, the 
Treasury Department, and the New York Department of Financial 
                                                      
97 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve 
Board Issues Consent Cease and Desist Order, and Assesses Civil Money 
Penalty Against Standard Chartered PLC and Standard Chartered Bank (Dec. 
10, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/ 
20121210a.htm [https://perma.cc/V4X9-HG2L]. 
98 Chad Bray, Standard Chartered Agrees to 3-year Extension of 
Nonprosecution Agreements, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:53 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/standard-chartered-extends-
deferred-prosecution-agreements-for-3-years/ [https://perma.cc/9R77-T3BX]. 
99 Sarah Todd, RBS to Settle Foreign Sanctions Probe for $100 Million, AM. 




101 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty 
and to Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing Financial Transactions for 
Countries Subject to U.S. Economic Sanctions (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-89-
billion-illegally-processing-financial [http://perma.cc/MQP2-KMNV]. 
102 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Reaches Largest Ever 
Sanctions-Related Settlement with BNP Paribas SA for $963 million (June 
30, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
jl2447.aspx [https://perma.cc/C99Z-7RXZ]. 
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Services for violations of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act and the Trading With the Enemy Act.103 The violations 
occurred between August 2003 and September 2008.104 Similarly, in 
2015 Commerzbank agreed to pay $1.5 billion to settle charges that it 
had violated the Bank Secrecy Act, which targets money laundering, 
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which targets 
transfer of funds for countries subject to economic sanctions.105 These 
violations occurred from 2002 to 2008.106 Also in 2015, Deutsche 
Bank settled charges that it had violated the economic sanctions laws 
and agreed to pay $258 million to the Federal Reserve and the New 
York Department of Financial Services.107 The violations occurred 
from 1999 to 2006.108  
 Presently, charges for violations of money laundering and/or 
economic sanctions laws brought by U.S. authorities are pending 
against Société Générale and Unicredit.109 All of these actions are 
evidence of not only recurrent violations, but also violations by 
numerous members of the financial services industry. 
 Citigroup provides another example of recurrent violations of 
law as well as recidivist conduct.110 Citigroup has been charged with 
repeated violations of federal securities laws regulating research 
analysts’ conduct.111 Citigroup was fined by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2014 for violating laws concerning 
research analysts’ communications with respect to the planned Toys 
                                                      
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crédit Agricole Corporate and 
Investment Bank Admits to Sanctions Violations, Agrees to Forfeit $312 





105 Ben Protess, Commerzbank of Germany to Pay $1.5 Billion in U.S. Case, 




107 Liz Moyer, Deutsche Bank to Pay $258 Million and Fire 6, N.Y. TIMES: 




109 See Moyer, supra note 107. 
110 See Corkery, supra note 84. 
111 Id. 
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“R” Us initial public offering.112 In 2013, Citigroup was charged when 
an analyst shared unpublished research about Apple with hedge funds 
and a fund manager.113 It was similarly charged in 2012 for a research 
analyst sharing nonpublic information concerning Facebook, and in 
2011 for violating FINRA rules concerning research analysts’ assisting 
issuers in the preparation of road show presentations.114 Citigroup has 
also settled with regulators for violating U.S. laws in actions involving 
misrepresentations in the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), mortgage servicing violations, manipulation of foreign 
currency markets, and manipulation of LIBOR and other 
benchmarks.115  
 Additional recent violations of law involving research analyst 
activities are further evidence of recidivist conduct. In 2003, the SEC, 
state prosecutors, and market regulators reached a $1.4 billion 
settlement with ten firms, including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit 
Suisse First Boston, and UBS Warburg, for actions alleging conflicts 
of interest on the part of stock research analysts, as well as fraud and 
misrepresentations, in violation of federal law.116 Ten years later, ten 
firms, including many of the same banks charged in 2003, were 
charged by FINRA with the same violations regarding conflicts of 
interest and research analysts’ communications with potential 
investment banking clients.117 FINRA concluded that flouting these 
securities regulations was the norm for every one of the firms.118  
 Recurrent violations have also occurred across large segments 
of the industry with respect to particular legal standards. Investigators 
in the RMBS Working Group probed misrepresentations in mortgage 
                                                      
112 10 Wall Street Firms Fined over Conflicts in Toys ‘R’ Us I.P.O., N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/11/10-wall-street-firms-fined-over-conflicts-in-toys-r-us-i-p-o/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z76L-T2QC]. 
113 Corkery, supra note 84. 
114 Id. 
115 Philip Mattera, Citigroup: Corporate Rap Sheet, CORP. RES. PROJECT 
http://www.corp-research.org/citigroup [https://perma.cc/74H3-KE3B]. 
116 Stephen Labaton, Wall Street Settlement: The Overview; 10 Wall Street 




117 Morgenson, supra note 4. 
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bond sales leading to the 2008 mortgage crisis.119 They found 
improper actions occurred “not only occasionally, but in the end, with 
almost every deal examined.”120 
 For example, Citigroup’s $7 billion settlement was based on 
misrepresentations that violated federal laws in various RMBS 
offerings in 2006 and 2007.121 Settlements were also reached in 
November 2013 for similar violations by J.P. Morgan Chase and two 
institutions it had acquired, Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual.122 
Likewise, Bank of America and two institutions it had acquired, 
Merrill Lynch and Countrywide Financial, reached settlements in 
August 2014 for similar federal securities law violations.123 J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Credit Suisse also settled with the SEC and agreed 
to pay more than $400 million combined for misleading investors in 
offerings of residential mortgage-backed securities.124 J.P. Morgan 
Chase was charged with misconduct in its 2006 RMBS offering, while 
Bear Stearns, the company it later acquired, was charged with 
violations in 156 different RMBS transactions issued from 2005 to 
2007.125 Credit Suisse was charged with violations in seventy-five 
                                                      
119 See Jody Shenn, Flaws Found in ‘Almost Every’ Mortgage-Bond Deal as 
Crash Began, 102 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 967 (2014). 
120 Id. 
121 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State 
Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for 
Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages (July 14, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-
partners-secure-record-7-billion-global-settlement [https://perma.cc/KH8T-
6HTQ]. See generally Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶3152 (Aug. 9, 
1989) (containing the civil penalty provision of the FIRREA). 
122 See infra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing a $13 billion 
settlement with J.P. Morgan to resolve federal and state civil claims arising 
out of the issuance of mortgage-backed securities by J.P. Morgan, Bear 
Stearns, and Washington Mutual after J.P. Morgan acknowledged that it made 
misrepresentations). 
123 See infra notes 276, 294 and accompanying text (discussing a $16.65 
billion settlement with Bank of America Corporation as well as Countrywide 
Financial Corporation and Merrill Lynch in relation to ongoing civil 
investigation related to issuance, underwriting, and origination of mortgage 
loans). 
124 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan and 
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different RMBS transactions issued from 2005 to 2010.126 Following a 
trial, Nomura Securities and Royal Bank of Scotland were found liable 
in May 2015 for misleading Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in their sales 
of mortgage-backed securities.127 Judge Cote wrote in a May 11, 2015 
ruling in the case that “[t]he magnitude of falsity, conservatively 
measured, is enormous.”128 
 A distinct industry-wide example of improper conduct 
involves mortgage servicers’ activities. In 2012, the Justice 
Department, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
forty-nine attorneys general, and other federal agencies reached a $25 
billion settlement with the nation’s five largest mortgage servicers: 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citibank, and Ally 
Financial (formally GMAC).129 This was to resolve violations of state 
and federal law with respect to loan servicing and foreclosure 
practices.130 A year later recidivist conduct was uncovered.131 Three of 
the five institutions subject to the settlement had failed to fully comply 
with its requirements, based on investigation by a court appointed 
monitor.132 In 2015, the Comptroller of the Currency again found 
noncompliance with earlier foreclosure settlements on the part of J.P. 
Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and other banks, and restricted their 
purchases of mortgage servicing rights.133 In a separate settlement 
involving Ocwen Financial Corp. and the New York State Department 
of Financial Services, a 2012 examination revealed “widespread 
noncompliance with the 2011 [Settlement] Agreement” aimed at 
                                                      
126 Id. 
127 Bob Van Voris, Nomura, RBS Slammed by Judge for ‘Enormous’ 
Mortgage Deception, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 975 (May 19, 
2015). 
128 Id. (quoting Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 3d 441, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
129 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing 




131 Andrew M. Ballard, Compliance Deficiencies Remain After $25 billion 
Mortgage Settlement, Monitor Says, 101 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 925 
(Dec. 10, 2013). 
132 Id. 
133 Jesse Hamilton, OCC Limits Servicing Rights Purchases: JPMorgan, 
Wells Fargo Among Targets, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1170 (June 
23, 2015). 
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remediating mortgage servicing deficiencies.134 Due to these 
violations, Ocwen agreed to host a monitor for up to three years and 
pay $150 million in restitution.135 
A final example of both recurrent violation of law and 
violations by numerous industry members is provided by industry 
manipulation of both foreign exchange rates and the LIBOR rates. 
Four banks—Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Barclays, and Royal Bank 
of Scotland—agreed with the Justice Department to plead guilty to 
felony charges for manipulating the foreign currency exchange market 
and to pay $2.5 billion in criminal fines.136 The wrongdoing occurred 
from 2007 to 2013.137 The Federal Reserve imposed a separate fine on 
the four banks of $1.6 billon, as well as a fine on UBS, which 
committed similar manipulation of LIBOR rates.138 Barclays settled 
related claims with U.S. and U.K. authorities and agreed to pay a 
combined penalty of approximately $1.3 billion.139 Adding earlier 
settlements with U.S. and European regulators, the five banks have 
been subjected to fines and penalties of nearly $9 billion.140  
 U.S. and European regulators have imposed $6 billion in fines 
on ten banks and brokerage firms for manipulating the London 
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and the European interbank offered 
rate (EURIBOR).141 Three additional banks—HSBC, J.P. Morgan 
Chase, and Crédit Agricole—have been similarly charged, but refused 
to settle.142 Barclays, for example, admitted to misconduct between 
2005 and 2009 and agreed to pay both a $160 million penalty in its 
agreement with the Justice Department and a $200 million penalty in 
                                                      
134 Stephen Joyce, Ocwen Agrees to Pay $150 million, Finance On-Site 
Independent Monitor in Lawsky Order, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 
10 (Jan. 6, 2015) (quoting Consent Order Pursuant to New York Banking Law 
§ 44, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Serv. (Dec. 19, 2014)). 
135 Id. 
136 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-
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its agreement with the CFTC.143 One scheme flourished from 2005 to 
2007 and continued sporadically through 2009.144 A second scheme 
took place from August 2007 to January 2009.145 United Bank of 
Switzerland and its various subsidiaries agreed to a total of more than 
$1.5 billion in penalties and disgorgement with U.S., U.K., and Swiss 
authorities for LIBOR manipulation from 2006 through 2009.146 UBS 
Securities Japan also agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud.147 
Deutsche Bank has been ordered to pay a $2.5 billion fine to settle 
investigations by U.S. and U.K. regulators for rigging LIBOR 
benchmark rates from 2003 to 2011.148 In the LIBOR manipulation 
investigations the Justice Department concluded that, “certain 
institutions condoned a culture of illegal behavior.”149  
 These many examples of corporate misconduct demonstrate 
the financial services industry’s pattern of recurrent violations of law 
and recidivist behavior.  
 
                                                      
143 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits 
Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate 
and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty 





145 James B. Stewart, A Calculated Deal in an Investigation into Rate-
Rigging, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/14/business/in-barclays-inquiry-the-calculation-in-making-a-deal-
common-sense.html [https://perma.cc/7LVE-PDPF]. 
146 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to 
Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of 




148 Deutsche Bank to Pay Record $2.5 Billion, Fire Employees to End U.S.-
U.K Libor Probes, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 813 (Apr. 28, 2015). 
149 Jeff Bater, Top Justice Department Official Urges Banks To Create ‘A 
Culture of Compliance’, 101 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 848 (Nov. 26, 
2013) (showcasing statements made by Deputy Attorney General James 
Cole). 
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III. A Modest Evolution in Regulatory Philosophy 
 
A. Recognition of Complexity and Behavioral 
Influences in Consumer Decision Making 
 
There is an interesting contrast between the evolving view of 
financial industry regulators with respect to consumer decision-making 
and the static view of these regulators with respect to corporate 
decision making. In the realm of consumer decision-making, U.S. 
regulators in recent years went to great lengths to document the 
multiple influences on consumer decisions, including cognitive 
limitations and decision-making heuristics.150 As a result, regulatory 
policy was modified in recognition of these influences and the 
resultant limits to self-protection by consumers.151 However, in the 
realm of corporate decision making, multiple influences including 
cognitive influences and heuristics have been ignored. The same 
cannot be said of financial industry regulators in the United Kingdom. 
There, cognitive influences on both consumer decisions and corporate 
decisions have been acknowledged, and regulatory policy, including 
enforcement policy, is evolving in response.152 
 Before 2008, the regulatory approach to consumer protection 
relied on a rational decision-maker model.153 Namely, consumers 
could protect themselves against unfair or unsafe financial products by 
weighing all the risks and the benefits of the product in question.154 
Cost-benefit evaluation was considered the basis of consumer 
decisions, with the law intervening merely to provide full and early 
disclosure in order to allow proper cost-benefit evaluations. 
 Studies, however, confirmed that many consumers are unable 
to protect themselves in the mortgage market that emerged in the last 
decade.155 The Federal Reserve Board recognized this state of affairs 
                                                      
150 See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text (discussing how the Federal 
Reserve Board and FSA recognized consumer behaviors in implementing 
regulations and policies). 
151 See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (noting that regulators 
recognize that timing or manner of disclosures will not lead to effective self-
protection if consumers are overloaded with information).  
152 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 25. 
153 See supra Part II.B.  
154 See id. 
155 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524–26 (July 30, 2008) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRODUCT 
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when it modified real estate lending regulations in July 2008.156 
Similarly, the FSA recognized that behavioral biases on the part of 
consumers have a significant impact on what can be achieved through 
disclosure, education, and counseling.157 Both regulators, therefore, 
considered greater product intervention.158 
 The Federal Reserve Board and the FSA recognized that the 
inability of consumers to protect themselves results from a 
combination of market characteristics and behavioral barriers as they 
interact in the decision-making process of individual consumers. The 
factors identified by one or both agencies include: (1) the market 
characteristic of limited transparency, particularly in the market for 
subprime loans, which prevents comparison shopping;159 (2) the 
market and cognitive characteristic that innovative mortgage products 
are too complex to be understood and properly evaluated by 
consumers, a barrier exacerbated by inexperience;160 (3) the behavioral 
                                                                                                                   
INTERVENTION 16 (2011) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/ 
dp11_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFA6-855L]. 
156 See id. 
157 See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, 2011, Cm. 8012, at 70–71 (UK), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/81411/consult_newfinancial_regulation170211.pdf [http://perma.cc/YES5-
DTVF] (discussing an early intervention policy, an array of powers to impose 
product requirements and standards, and even to ban products or product 
features); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW 72–75 (2009) 
(UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/fsa-dp09-03.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/4RRM-8MYW] [hereinafter MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW]; FIN. 
SERVS. AUTH., CONSUMER RESPONSIBILITY 16–19 (2008) (UK), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp08_05.pdf [http://perma.cc/APQ7-
CFGJ] [hereinafter CONSUMER RESPONSIBILITY] (discussing cognitive biases 
on the part of consumers).  
158 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 155.  
159 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524 (“[S]ubprime rates, which 
can vary significantly based on the individual borrower’s risk profile, are not 
broadly advertised and are usually obtainable only after application and 
paying a fee.”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 155, at 24 (observing that it 
can be difficult for consumers to compare products, in part due to opaque 
charging structures). 
160 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524–25 (using adjustable rate 
mortgages as an example of a nontraditional loan product which “tend to be 
complex for consumers”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FCA’S USE OF 
TEMPORARY PRODUCT INTERVENTION RULES 10 (2012) (UK) (explaining that 
some financial products or features may be “so complex that most consumers 
. . . would be unable to understand, or would have difficulty understanding the 
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characteristic of limited shopping caused by the combined effect of 
limited transparency, complexity, and the cost of comparison 
shopping;161 (4) persistent negative beliefs concerning credit 
availability and ability to qualify for loans (pessimism bias) that 
prevent some consumers from shopping for more favorable terms;162 
and (5) the inability of consumers to properly evaluate additional 
information that might be disclosed, in part due to complexity but also 
due to decision-making heuristics, including limited focus.163  
 Focusing on behavioral and cognitive barriers to consumer 
self-protection, regulators recognized that market barriers to consumer 
self-protection combine with additional psychological barriers that 
surface from invalid borrower beliefs.164 One such belief is that lenders 
are required by law to provide the best possible rate on loans.165 
Another belief is that lenders or brokers will offer suitable products.166 
The FSA found that consumers assume that no firm will identify 
options that are not broadly appropriate for them.167 This leads to 
limited comparison shopping or no comparison shopping.168 
                                                                                                                   
risks or features of the product they are purchasing”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 
supra note 155, at 26 (positing that the complexity of financial products plus 
the behavioral biases of consumers can result in misleading views about a 
product). 
161 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525; Patricia McCoy, Rethinking 
Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 123, 140–41 
(observing that fees and interest rates are disclosed after the consumer pays a 
nonrefundable application fee). 
162 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525. 
163 Id. 
164 See MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW, supra note 158, at 72–75; CONSUMER 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 158, at 8.  
165 The Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that more than 40 percent 
of borrowers generally, almost two-thirds of African-American borrowers, 
and 75 percent of Spanish speaking Hispanic borrowers did not know that this 
statement was false. FANNIE MAE, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S 
HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS: 2003 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 7 
(2003), http://fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/ 
survey2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5J-SYWC]. 
166 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW: DISTRIBUTION AND 
DISCLOSURE 12 (2010) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp10_28.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4LY-RN26]. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. The FSA reported that consumers see intermediaries more as a 
means for accessing available produces because they assume all firms will 
offer appropriate options implying no need to comparison shop. See id. 
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 Third, borrows tend to pessimistically believe that they have 
poorer credit quality than they actually do.169 A Freddie Mac 
Consumer Credit Survey found that 30 percent of white borrowers, 
approximately one-third of Latino borrowers, and approximately 50 
percent of African-American borrowers who had good credit believed 
they had poor credit.170 As a result consumers will accept a subprime 
mortgage at a higher interest rate, carrying higher fees and a 
prepayment penalty because they believe they would not qualify for a 
prime mortgage or a non-prime mortgage with a lower interest rate and 
fee structure.171   
A fourth belief that prevents consumer self-protection is the 
misconception among low-income borrowers and subprime borrowers 
that there are few alternatives available to them, either due to fewer 
lenders willing to make loans in their communities or due to the lower 
quality of their credit history.172 Both U.S. and U.K. regulatory 
authorities uncovered this belief.173  
Pessimism concerning credit quality and/or availability of 
credit may be characterized as pessimism bias, the opposite of the 
optimism bias displayed in most situations by most individuals.174 
Pessimism bias is most prevalent among low-income and minority 
                                                      
169 See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad 
Credit, Wealth and Race, 45:2, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 223, 229–30 (2001) 
(citing FREDDIE MAC, 1999 CONSUMER CREDIT SURV. (1999)). 
170 See id.; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: 
APPROACH TO REGULATION 24 (2011) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov. 
uk/pubs/events/fca_approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/3222-72MR] (stating there 
can be opportunities for firms to exploit consumer behavior such as lack of 
confidence or knowledge in retail markets). 
171 See Ards & Myers, supra note 169, at 238. 
172 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY 
DEV. & RESEARCH, FR-5180-F-02, RESPA: REGULATORY IMPACT AND 
INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS 2–102 (2008), http://www. 
hud.gov/offices/hsg/ramh/res/impactanalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GLJ-
82RA] (“Finally, households in low-income and minority neighborhoods may 
perceive that there are fewer opportunities to find a mortgage because of a 
lack of prime lenders in their neighborhoods . . . . Subprime borrowers are 
more likely to believe that they have fewer opportunities because of their 
credit circumstances and brokers may reinforce their perceptions.”). 
173 See generally FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW: 
STAGE 2 REPORT 9–10 (2008) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/other/MER2_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5E-2YK2] (explaining that 
subprime consumers did not see traditional lenders as a realistic option). 
174 See id. 
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borrowers.175 Regulators recognized that all of these beliefs undermine 
self-protection by serving as barriers to comparison shopping.176 
Consumer pessimism leads to an emotional response to a favorable 
credit decision that undermines rational decision making. Relief is 
triggered when a loan application is approved, and fear is triggered that 
if the particular loan offered is not accepted, regardless of its terms, no 
other lender or loan will be available.177 
 A final barrier to consumer self-protection recognized by 
regulators concerns the manner in which consumers make decisions in 
the mortgage market.178 There has been a great deal of research 
concerning decision-making heuristics, including decision making in 
the mortgage loan process.179 For example, regulators have recognized 
limited focus as a decision-making heuristic among consumers.180 The 
Federal Reserve Board noted: 
 
 Consumers considering obtaining a typically complex 
subprime mortgage loan may simplify their decision 
by focusing on a few attributes of the product or 
service that seem most important. A consumer may 
focus on loan attributes that have the most obvious 
and immediate consequence such as loan amount, 
down payment, initial monthly payment, initial 
interest rate, and up-front fees . . . . These consumers, 
therefore, may not focus on terms that may seem less 
immediately important to them such as future 
increases in payment amounts or interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, and negative amortization. 
They are also not likely to focus on underwriting 
practices such as income verification, and on features 
such as escrows for future tax and insurance 
obligations . . . . Thus, consumers may unwittingly 
accept loans that they will have difficulty repaying.181 
                                                      
175 See id. at 10. 
176 See id. at 5. 
177 Id. 
178 See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The 
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 766–806 (2006). 
179 See id. 
180 See generally Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg at 44,525–26. 
181 Id. (footnotes omitted). Research on the part of the Federal Reserve staff 
has found, for example, that 40 percent of borrowers with income less than 
$50,000—corresponding to the bottom half of the income distribution of 
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Similarly, the FSA concluded that many consumers focus only on 
short-term costs, and are therefore seduced by an attractive initial 
interest rate.182 This is true even among relatively sophisticated 
borrowers, who focused on the initial monthly payment.183 
 As a result of the many consumer barriers to self-protection, 
regulatory authorities in the United States and United Kingdom have 
recognized that modifications in the timing or manner of disclosures 
will not lead to effective self-protection. The U.S. General 
Accountability Office came to this conclusion as early as 2004, after 
discussions with federal officials and consumer advocates.184 It found 
that due to complexity in the terms of non-prime mortgages and 
borrowers’ lack of financial education and sophistication, greater 
consumer education and even clear and transparent disclosures would 
be of limited effectiveness in decreasing the incidence of predatory 
lending practices.185 The FSA expressed similar doubt that increased 
disclosure will change consumer behavior.186 
                                                                                                                   
ARM borrowers—are unaware of their per-period caps on their ARM 
mortgages, 53 percent are unaware of their lifetime cap, and 40 percent are 
unaware of the index of their ARM. By contrast, 13 percent of borrowers with 
income exceeding $150,000—the top income decile of ARM borrowers—are 
unaware of their per period caps, while 21 percent are unaware of their 
lifetime cap, and 8 percent are unaware of the index. See BRIAN BUCKS & 
KAREN PENCE, FED. RESERVE BD., DO HOMEOWNERS KNOW THEIR HOUSE 
VALUES AND MORTGAGE TERMS 20, 36 (2006), http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603abs.html [https://perma.cc/7EJH-7PRK]. 
182 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW: RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING 57–58 (2010) (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/ 
consultation/fsa-cp10-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KUH-WJRR]. 
183 Id.; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 155, at 26 (describing how 
consumers do not focus on costs that will arise later such as mortgage exit 
fees or mortgage arrears charges). 
184 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 040280, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN 
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 94–98 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/160/157511.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLU2-USC7]. 
185 Id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 127–30 (2008) (finding evidence of a lack of 
understanding of mortgage loan terms and products on the part of consumers). 
186 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 182, at 73–74. 
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Indeed, additional disclosures may be counterproductive due 
to information overload, and, in any event, are likely to be ineffective 
due to limited focus.187 As the Federal Reserve concluded: 
 
Disclosures describing the multiplicity of features of a 
complex loan could help some consumers in the 
subprime market, but may not be sufficient to protect 
them against unfair loan terms or lending practices. 
Obtaining widespread consumer understanding of the 
many potentially significant features of a typical 
subprime product is a major challenge. If consumers 
do not have a certain minimum level understanding of 
the market and products, disclosures for complex and 
infrequent transactions may not effectively provide 
that minimum understanding. Moreover, even if all of 
a loan’s features are disclosed clearly to consumers, 
they may continue to focus on a few features that 
appear most significant. Alternatively, disclosing all 
features may “overload” consumers and make it more 
difficult for them to discern which features are most 
important.188 
 
 It is interesting to note that regulators in the United Kingdom 
similarly have recognized not only the multiple influences on 
consumer decisions, but also that these influences interact. The 
Financial Conduct Authority explained that it:  
 
will base its regulatory interventions on a deeper 
understanding of underlying commercial and 
behavioural drivers and the often multiple causes of 
poor outcomes for consumers. This will involve 
analysis of often complex chains of interaction.189 
 
 All of these statements and actions regarding regulatory policy 
reflect recognition of the multiple influences on consumer decisions, 
including, but not limited to, cognitive barriers and decision-making 
                                                      
187 Vincent Di Lorenzo, Barriers to Market Discipline: A Comparative Study 
of Regulatory Reforms, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 517, 527 (2012). 
188 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,526 (citation omitted); see also 
Willis, supra note 178, at 767 (discussing cognitive responses to information 
overload). 
189 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 170. 
236 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW VOL. 36 
 
heuristics. Has a similar recognition occurred with respect to corporate 
decision making? 
 
B. Regulatory Blindness Toward Corporate Decision 
Making 
 
 Regulators have recognized both the market realities and 
behavioral barriers that often prevent effective decision making on the 
part of consumers.190 Regulators in the United States have not, 
however, explicitly recognized behavioral barriers to proper risk 
assessment on the part of corporate actors. Nor have they recognized 
the interaction of multiple influences on corporate behavior. As a 
result, U.S. regulators continue to emphasize larger and larger fines as 
the key to deterrence.191 This deterrence strategy is based on the 
continuing assumption that corporate decisions reflect a complete 
evaluation of all short-term and long-term risks, and are determined by 
such cost-benefit evaluations. 
 
1. Influences on Industry Compliance 
Decisions 
 
Some studies of organizational behavior have embraced 
complexity theory as descriptive of decision making in business 
organizations.192 Kagan, Cunningham, and Thornton’s quantitative and 
qualitative analyses led them to conclude that “theories of corporate 
environmental behavior that focus on a single variable—whether legal, 
economic or attitudinal—are almost always doomed to be incomplete 
and inadequate.”193 Legal standards, policies, and actions are just one 
set of influences on corporate behavior. Another influence is the 
precision of the governing legal standards.194 Yet another influence is 
                                                      
190 See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524–26. 
191 See infra note 298 and accompanying text. See generally Part III.B.3. 
192 See, e.g., Robert Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental 
Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 76–
78 (2003). See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage 
Unethical Conduct in the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 
765, 770–71 (summarizing studies and perceived influences on corporate 
behavior). 
193 Kagan, supra note 192, at 76–78. 
194 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law As A Determinant of 
Business Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 288 (2007) (“[I]n a regime with a 
vague legal standard the influence of law on corporate conduct is weakest.”); 
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the frequency of inspections and sanctions.195 Studies and 
commentators have offered a difference of opinion on the significance 
of the size of legal sanctions on corporate decisions.196 However, many 
studies have provided support for the influence of the frequency of 
inspections, and the frequency and severity of sanctions.197 This debate 
is part of a broader debate about whether enforcement policy should 
assume rational decision making by corporate actors—rational 
decision making viewed through the lens of neoclassical economic 
analysis.198 
However, factors influencing legal compliance are not limited 
to the nature of the legal mandate and the severity and frequency of 
sanctions.199 Legal compliance is also influenced by market realities, 
including prevailing business models that shape corporate decisions. 
One business model bases corporate decisions on cost-benefit 
                                                                                                                   
Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles-and Rules-
Based Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91, 99 (2003) (“[A] relatively large 
experimental literature provides evidence that the aggressiveness of reporting 
decisions increases with the imprecision of the relevant reporting standard.”). 
195 See Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative 
Bases, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 41, 45 (2004) (summarizing prior studies 
regarding the influence of various factors, such as inspection frequency and 
consistency, perceived legitimacy of regulations, reputation, and ability to 
comply including costs and competitive effects). 
196 See John Braitwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of 
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7, 35 (1991) (finding little 
support for the additive or multiplicative effects of the certainty of detection, 
certainty of punishment, and severity of punishment). 
197 See Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement 
Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 177, 
199–202 (1993); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and 
Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 209, 237 (1989); Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 95–102 (studying 
the mortgage market in the period 2002–2008 in which benefits of 
noncompliance or evasion outweighed costs of noncompliance when 
sanctions were infrequent); Di Lorenzo, supra note 193, at 782–803 
(discussing cost-benefit evaluations of legal sanctions in the securities 
industry, and comparing it to cost-benefit evaluations in the banking industry 
and the industry’s compliance record under the Community Reinvestment 
Act). 
198 See generally Becker, supra note 10. 
199 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 770–71 n.17. 
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evaluations.200 Legal mandates are strictly followed or creatively 
ignored as a result of an evaluation of the benefits and risks of 
noncompliance.201 In other words, resolute legal compliance is not a 
given, but rather a determination made by industry actors in a 
particular context. Frequency and level of legal sanctions contribute to 
the costs of non-compliance, but are not the only costs industry actors 
encounter.202 Another cost is the adverse impact on the reputation of 
the corporation.203  
Cost-benefit evaluation is not the only business model 
influencing corporate behavior. A related business model bases 
decisions on the goal of generating substantial and rising short-term 
profits to meet the demands of investors and to sustain and increase the 
corporation’s stock price.204  
In addition to the nature of the legal mandate, the nature of 
enforcement policy, and relevant market realities, corporate decisions 
are influenced by cognitive limitations and decision-making 
heuristics.205 These limit a complete recognition of long-term risks.206 
Finally, personality traits of corporate actors have an influence on 
corporate behavior.207 Personality traits trigger emotional responses to 
market conditions and influence the overall corporate culture.208 
Market realities, including accepted business models, cognitive 
limitations, and heuristics, as well as personality traits of corporate 
actors, all combine to create a corporate culture. This corporate culture 
is an important institutional influence on corporate behavior—an 
                                                      
200 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 91–100 (studying corporate decisions 
based on cost-benefit evaluations in the 2008 mortgage crisis and the period 
preceding it). 
201 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 103; Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 784.  
202 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 784. 
203 See May, supra note 195, at 48. Reputational concerns enhance the sense 
of obligation to comply. Id. 
204 See Sean Silverthorne, The High Risks of Short-Term Management, HARV. 
BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 11, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs. 
edu/item/the-high-risks-of-short-term-management [https://perma.cc/FH4M-
AFAJ]. 
205 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 788; Susanna K. Ripken, Predictions, 
Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate 
Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 958–68 (2005) 
(explaining the impact of several decision-making heuristics on corporate 
decision making). 
206 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 788. 
207 See Giberson et al., supra note 27, at 123–37.  
208 Id. at 133–35. 
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influence distinct and perhaps more important than the influence of 
government standards, policies and actions.209  
Behavioral barriers to effective risk assessment among 
industry actors have been the subject of study far less frequently than 
behavioral barriers among consumers.210 The studies conducted have 
found no difference between the use of decision-making heuristics in 
group decision making and organizational behavior in corporations.211 
Accordingly, regulators must recognize that cognitive limitations and 
decision-making heuristics affect industry actors as much as they 
affect the general public.212  
Regulators must also recognize complexity in corporate 
decisions, specifically the interaction of multiple influences on 
corporate decisions. These multiple influences on corporate behavior 
can skew cost-benefit evaluations in favor of “creative compliance,” 
“creative non-compliance,” or, at times, in favor of violation of clear 
legal mandates.213 
 Three decision-making heuristics that can play a significant 
role in corporate decisions on compliance with regulatory mandates 
are: skewed risk perception, simplified decision making, and the 
representativeness heuristic. 
 Skewed risk perception is the inverse relationship between 
perceptions of risks versus benefits.214 When a significant benefit (e.g., 
substantial profits) is perceived to result from evasion or 
noncompliance with legal mandates, then any risk posed by the 
                                                      
209 See Michael D. Watkins, What Is Organizational Culture? And Why 
Should We Care?, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 15, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/05/what-is-organizational-culture [https://perma.cc/ 
MU9D-8WHH]. 
210 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 540.  
211 Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral 
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1714 (2003); see, e.g., JAMES 
MONTIER, BEHAVING BADLY 3–9 (Feb. 2, 2006), 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php [https://perma.cc/XJ7N-8W98] 
(studying professional fund managers and revealing over-optimism, 
confirmatory bias, representativeness, framing, and loss aversion). 
212 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 540. 
213 Id.; see Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541 (finding that complexity can 
cause people to use simplified decision making, which does not maximize 
their utility). For a discussion of violations of state law by U.S. banking 
institutions in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and violations of federal law 
in consumer bankruptcy proceedings, see Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and 
Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 146 (2008). 
214 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541. 
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activity (e.g., legal sanction) is viewed as a low probability risk.215 
This holds true regardless of the actual objective level of risk that a 
disinterested third-party would perceive.216 
 When individuals face complexities arising from many 
interacting variables and uncertainties regarding future outcomes, 
including potential initiation of lawsuits and exposure to liability, they 
resort to a simplified decision-making strategy. 217 In making such 
decisions, individuals give the highest value to the individual’s most 
important choices,218 such as preserving or increasing profits, and 
ignore risks they perceive as low probability, such as civil penalties 
imposed by regulators. 219  
 The representativeness heuristic is a tendency to judge the 
probability of an event based on the extent to which the event “is . . . 
similar in essential properties to its parent population” and “reflects the 
salient features of the process by which it is generated.”220 Similarity 
in salient features leads to a conclusion of similar probability.221 In 
turn, when two events are judged or thought to be dissimilar in salient 
features, then the probability of the same outcome is deemed either 
unlikely or unable to be determined by the outcome in the earlier 
event.222  
 These multiple influences on corporate decisions and 
decision-making heuristics affect corporate regulatory compliance, and 
should therefore factor into regulators’ decisions about sanctions 
imposed in an effort to minimize corporate wrongdoing.  
 
                                                      
215 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 40–41 (2002). 
216 See id. 
217 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541; see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, 
at 1078–79. 
218 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541; see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28, 
at 1078–79. 
219 Di Lorenzo, supra 192, at 283 n.84. 
220 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment 
of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1972); see also 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 97 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (“[R]esults reported in preceding studies provide 
direct support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of events 
by the degree to which these events are representative of a relevant model or 
process.”). 
221 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 220, at 431. 
222 See id. at 466. 
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2. Countrywide As a Test Case 
 
The experience of Countrywide Financial illustrates the 
multiple influences on corporate behavior that can lead to excessive 
risk taking and willingness to ignore legal mandates.223  
Countrywide operated in a business environment that 
emphasized short-term profits and increasing market share.224 Prior to 
2003, Countrywide’s loan offerings reflected a commitment to the 
legal mandate to originate “safe” and “prudent” loans.225 After 2003, 
Countrywide changed its former policy and “increasingly offered 
‘innovative,’ riskier products.”226 Origination of riskier loan products 
increased profits, stock price, and executive compensation.227 In 
addition to the effect of higher profits on stock price, the industry view 
was that increases in market share would also lead to increases in 
Countrywide’s stock price.228 Due to the offering of “innovative” 
mortgage products, Countrywide’s market share in the U.S. mortgage 
market increased from 11.4 percent in December 2003 to 15.7 percent 
in September 2006.229 By 2005, Countrywide had become the largest 
mortgage lender in the United States, recognizing earnings of $2.1 
billion, $2.4 billion, and $2 billion in its loan production divisions in 
2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively.230 The $2.4 billion in earnings in 
2005 represented an increase of 182 percent over earnings in 2002.231 
Countrywide’s stock price increased 561 percent in the ten years 
                                                      
223 An earlier version of the Countrywide case study was presented in Di 
Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541–45. 
224 Id. at 541–42; see also Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in 
Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 216, 228 (2013).  
225 12 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2016) (stating that Federal savings associations are 
required to adopt real estate lending policies that are “consistent with safe and 
sound banking practices” and that reflect “[p]rudent underwriting standards 
. . .”); see Complaint at 7, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 
2009). 
226 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 542; see Gretchen Morgenson, How 
Countrywide Covered the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2010), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/10/17/business/17trial.html [https://perma.cc/J4PV-
G42V]. 
227 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 542. 
228 See Complaint at 10–11, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 
2009); Morgenson, supra note 226. 
229 Complaint at 10, Mozilo, No. 09-03994. 
230 Id. at 7. 
231 Id. at 7–8. 
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ending in December 2006.232 Based on increased profit, market share, 
and stock price, Countywide CEO Angelo Mozilo received total 
compensation of $391.9 million in the five years ending in 2008.233 
Short-term profits and increased market share were realized 
via lending products and practices that posed long-term, and 
sometimes substantial, risks.234 These long-term risks were minimized 
or ignored due to the interplay of cognitive influences, decision-
making heuristics, and ego.235 One loan product that posed substantial 
long-term risks was the payment option adjustable rate mortgage 
(option ARM).236 By 2005, option ARMs accounted for 19 percent of 
Countrywide’s loan volume, making it the largest option ARM lender 
that year.237 A super-majority of Countrywide’s option ARMs were 
“low documentation” loans in which the borrower did not fully 
document income or assets.238 
In the spring of 2006, e-mail messages from Mr. Mozilo 
revealed he was very concerned about the delinquency risks posed by 
such loans as borrowers faced payment shocks from resets.239 
Nonetheless, he actively promoted the company’s option ARM loans 
to investors at a Wall Street conference.240 This was understandable in 
a corporate environment emphasizing short-term profits, since 
Countrywide’s gross profit margin was more than 4 percent on option 
                                                      
232 See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/ 
business/yourmoney/26country.html [https://perma.cc/AN4P-EPQ2]. 
233 Agustino Fontevecchia, Mozilo Pays Record Penalty to Settle Securities 
Fraud Cases, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2010), www.forbes.com/2010/10/15/mozilo-
sec-fraud-equities-markets-securities.html [https://perma.cc/C4FQ-UCQA]. 
234 See generally FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE 
RATE MORTGAGES (ARM) (2005) (providing an overview of adjustable-rate 
mortgages). 
235 Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 95. 
236 See generally FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 234, at 2. 
237 Ruth Simon & James Hagerty, Countrywide’s New Scare, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119318489086669202 
[https://perma.cc/23RC-QRJV]. 
238 Id. (“Of the option ARMs it issued last year, 91% were ‘low-doc’ 
mortgages in which the borrower didn’t fully document income or assets, 
according to UBS, compared with an industry average of 99% that year. In 
2004, 78% of Countrywide’s option ARMs carried less than full 
documentation.”). 
239 See Complaint at 20, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 
2009). 
240 Id. at 37. 
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ARMs, double the 2 percent profit margin generated by standard loans 
backed by the FHA.241 Securitized payment option ARM loans were 
sold by Countrywide and other originators to investors at higher prices, 
due to the higher interest rates they carried at reset and prepayment 
penalties.242 In addition, payment option ARMs that were kept in 
portfolio generated immediate phantom profits because banks were 
able to report as current income the fully amortizing repayment 
amount even when borrowers made minimum payments.243 At 
Countrywide, such phantom income equaled $654 million in 2006 and 
$1.26 billion in 2007.244 Future risks were minimized or ignored.245 
The hope was that risks would be shifted to purchasers of its 
mortgage-backed securities.246  
Another risky underwriting practice was underwriting an 
ARM based on payments due at the initial, low interest rate.247 
Countrywide later admitted that almost 60 percent of borrowers for 
whom it originated subprime hybrid ARMs would not have qualified 
at the fully indexed rate, even if interest rates did not increase.248 In 
other words, these borrowers would be unable to afford the loans 
except in the short-term.249 Countrywide ignored this risk.250 These 
underwriting practices, as well as the practice of underwriting no 
documentation loans, increased short-term fee income from origination 
fees and increased market share since more borrowers “qualified” for 
such loan products.251 
Countrywide’s increased underwriting of risky loan products 
was also influenced by the personality and ego of Mr. Mozilo.252 Mr. 
                                                      
241 See Morgenson, supra note 232. 
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243 See generally Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUS. WK. 
(Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/ 
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244 Complaint at 44, Illinois v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08CH22994 (Ill. 
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Mozilo had been treated as an outsider by Wall Street’s investment 
bankers who looked down on the flashy mortgage banker from Los 
Angeles.253 By 2003, Countrywide had become the third-largest 
residential loan originator in the U.S,254 and had a market share of 10 
percent when no originator had a market share greater than 13 
percent.255 Mr. Mozilo, however, wanted it to be number one, and 
wanted to dazzle Wall Street investment bankers by capturing a market 
share of at least 30 percent,256 a larger share than any company had 
ever achieved.257 Mr. Mozilo announced the goal of 30 percent market 
share at a Lehman Brothers Financial Services Conference in 2003.258 
Once he publicly stated that goal, there was enormous pressure inside 
Countrywide.259 The culture became: “[w]e got to do this.”260 To gain 
market share, Countrywide expanded its offerings of loan products for 
which more borrowers could “qualify,” such as no documentation 
loans.261 By the end of 2004, Countrywide had surpassed Wells Fargo 
as the largest residential loan originator in the United States.262 
These risky but profitable underwriting practices were made in 
a legal environment characterized by an imprecise legal mandate. 
During the period in question, Countrywide’s legal mandate was to 
adopt and adhere to real estate lending policies that were “consistent 
with safe and sound banking practices” and reflected “prudent 
underwriting standards.”263 In addition, risk assessment occurred in an 
environment in which legal compliance was not aggressively 
enforced.264 The multiple influences on Countrywide’s behavior, 








257 Bruck, supra note 252. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. (quoting Eric Flamholtz, UCLA business professor and consultant to 
Countrywide since the late nineties). 
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262 Bruck, supra note 252. 
263 See 12 C.F.R. § 365.2 (b)(1)–(2) (2016). 
264 See generally Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 95–98 (discussing the relaxed 
environment that exists in the market for mortgages). 
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legal mandate of “prudent” lending operations and “safe and sound” 
products and practices.265 
Countrywide’s actions from 2004 to 2007 reflect skewed risk 
perception. Long-term risks to Countrywide were downplayed or 
ignored by its corporate actors.266 It is sometimes assumed that the 
decision to downplay risks was rational, because risks were eliminated 
when the risky loans were sold to investors.267 In fact, this was not 
always or completely the case. Countrywide kept the riskiest portion of 
securitizations, the residuals, on its own balance sheet.268 By the end of 
2006, it had $2.8 billion of residuals on its balance sheet, equaling 15 
percent of its equity.269 Additionally, starting in 2005, it began to keep 
some of its risky loans on its balance sheet. In 2005 and 2006, 
Countrywide maintained a majority of the option ARMs it originated 
in the investment portfolio of Countrywide Bank.270 Countrywide also 
would be forced to repurchase some of the loans sold in the secondary 
market due to the loans’ risky characteristics that did not meet the 
underwriting requirements of some secondary market purchasers.271 
As Countrywide originated riskier loan products, a smaller percentage 
of loans that it did sell were eligible for sale on a nonrecourse basis.272 
Recourse loans allow the purchaser of loans that were sold in the 
secondary market to seek recourse against Countrywide when the 
borrowers defaulted.273 However, the large short-term profits produced 
by such loans caused Countrywide to ignore their long-term risks.274 
Countrywide’s actions also evidence simplified decision-
making. The mortgage crisis caused a significant number of lawsuits 
to later be filed against Countrywide or its acquirer, Bank of 
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271 Id. at 3. 
272 Id. at 14–15. 
273 Id. at 22–23. 
274 Id. at 13–15. 
275 James Sterngold, B of A, Ex-CEO Lewis Settle Crisis-Era Suits, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023046 
88104579463562665472416 [https://perma.cc/CB2T-UPT7]. 
246 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW VOL. 36 
 
when Countrywide’s loan practices were in place, the possibility of 
substantial liability in future litigation depended on a complex mix of 
factors.277 Substantial liability would require a substantial number of 
defaults.278 In addition, the possible total cost of future lawsuits, both 
private actions and government actions, was uncertain and subject to a 
complex set of possibilities.279 Considerations that contribute to 
uncertainty regarding the size and likelihood of litigation risks include: 
the likelihood that an action would be initiated, the ability of a plaintiff 
to avoid dismissal of the action, the size of a negotiated settlement, and 
the ability to receive partial reimbursement of the settlement through 
insurance and tax deductions.280 Simplified decision making would 
cause the corporate actor to conclude the potential risk created through 
such a complex interaction of variables is a low probability risk.281 
This conclusion is one more likely to be drawn in light of the 
significant profits generated by the activity in question.282 
 
3. Continued Regulatory Blindness in the 
United States 
 
The recent response of U.S. financial regulators to significant 
and continuing violations of law has been to impose larger and larger 
monetary sanctions.283 For example, in November 2013, the Justice 
                                                                                                                   
276 Settlements involve actions by both Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, two 
institutions acquired by Bank of America. They include a $9.5 billion 
settlement involving claims by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for securities 
sold to them, a $16.65 billion settlement with the Justice Department to settle 
claims brought by federal and state authorities, and various suits brought by 
mortgage securities investors, including an $8.5 billion settlement approved 
by the New York courts. See id.; Michael Corkery, Bank of America 
Settlement on Bonds That Soured Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 
31, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/judge-
approves-bank-of-america-mortgage-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/3BM2-
TU7J]; Bruck, supra note 252. 
277 Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 554. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 545. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 541. 
282 Morgenson, supra note 232. 
283 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Associate Attorney General 
Tony West Outlines Justice Department’s Approach to Toxic Mortgage Cases 
(July 16, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/asg/speeches/2014/asg-
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Department announced a $13 billion settlement with J.P. Morgan 
Chase, which included a $2 billion civil penalty.284 At the time, this 
was the largest settlement with a single entity in U.S. history.285 The 
settlement resolved federal and state civil claims arising out of 
packaging, marketing, sales, and issuance of residential mortgage 
backed securities (RMBS) prior to January 1, 2009.286 The Justice 
Department has outlined its approach in its enforcement policy in the 
RMBS cases.287 It seeks accountability, transparency and redress,288 
and has noted that accountability has taken the form of record-
breaking penalties.289 The large penalties are imposed to ensure “the 
penalty is [not] of such a level that it could be regarded by 
shareholders and management as merely the ‘cost of doing 
business.’”290 
 Similarly, in July 2014, the Justice Department announced a 
$7 billion settlement with Citigroup to resolve RMBS claims, 
including a $4 billion civil penalty.291 At the time, this was the largest 
civil penalty under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA).292 Again, the Justice Department 
emphasized that, “the size and scope of this resolution goes beyond 
what could be considered the mere cost of doing business.”293 One 
month later, the Justice Department announced a $16.65 billion 
settlement with Bank of America to resolve RMBS claims, which 
included a $5 billion penalty under FIRREA.294 The settlement is the 
                                                                                                                   
speech-140716.html [https://perma.cc/X2GY-REMT]; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24. 
284 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. This is one of the suits brought by U.S. federal and state agencies that 
form the RMBS Working Group. Id.  
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largest civil settlement with a single entity in U.S. history, and the 
penalty is the largest penalty ever imposed under FIRREA.295  
 In June 2014, the Justice Department announced an $8.9 
billion settlement with BNP Paribas for illegally processing financial 
transactions for countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions.296 FBI 
Director James Comey explained “[t]he significant financial penalties 
imposed on BNP Paribas sends a powerful deterrent message to any 
company that places its profits ahead of its adherence to the law.”297  
 The Justice Department’s statements concerning all of these 
settlements reflect a continuing embrace of rational decision making as 
the touchstone of corporate decisions, namely the view that cost-
benefit evaluations are the primary determinant of corporate 
decisions.298 They also reflect the view that there is a linear 
relationship between the size of fines and long-term corporate 
commitment to legal compliance.299 The penalties and statements 
ignore the influence of cognitive barriers and complexity in future 
compliance decisions.300 
 Corporate evaluations of recent enforcement actions may not 
necessarily lead to greater commitment to legal compliance due, in 
part, to the influence of the representativeness heuristic.301 The 
representativeness heuristic can be outer-directed or inner-directed.302 
In its outer-directed manifestation, a corporate actor evaluates external 
actions directed at the corporation, such as monetary sanctions 
imposed for legal violations, in light of the external environment in 
which the sanction is imposed.303 For example, the recent imposition 
of very large sanctions against the financial services industry can be 
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characterized as primarily a response to the 2008 mortgage crisis.304 
The settlements related to the 2008 mortgage crisis all emphasize that 
the banks’ conduct caused a crisis in the U.S. housing market that led 
to staggering losses to U.S. consumers and an international financial 
crisis.305 The size of the sanctions is deemed to be a unique response to 
this crisis.306 The outer-directed representative heuristic was witnessed 
in the past with respect to the substantial number of lawsuits, including 
criminal prosecutions following the savings and loan crisis.307 The 
likelihood of significant sanctions imposed for future wrongdoing will 
be judged in light of similarity or dissimilarity solely with a course of 
conduct that led to hundreds of billions of dollars of losses to U.S. 
consumers and the U.S. economy.308 
 Even if a comparison is made to a broader set of violations of 
law and resultant sanctions, namely sanctions for conspiracies to fix 
the LIBOR and foreign exchange rates and violations of money 
laundering or economic sanctions laws, it is likely that industry 
members will judge other future violations as dissimilar. The large 
number of industry members involved in the violations, and the 
importance of money laundering and economic sanctions laws to U.S. 
government officials, all limit the conclusion that these cases are 
similar to other, future legal violations.309 Money laundering or 
economic sanction violations will be deemed not representative of 
most future violations.310 Therefore, future violations will be judged 
unlikely to lead to similarly large sanctions. The possible fallacy in this 
assessment is that it is based on judgments regarding 
representativeness, and not the true underlying determinants of the 
likelihood and size of future sanctions sought in enforcement actions. 
If the government’s enforcement policy has changed, such that it is 
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more likely to seek substantial sanctions for all legal violations, the 
possible deterrent influence of the new policy will be short circuited by 
the representativeness heuristic.311 
 The representativeness heuristic can also be inner-directed.312 
In this manifestation it affects internal corporate evaluations of the 
similarity or dissimilarity of actions taken by various departments or 
individuals within a corporation.313 Tracey McDermott, director of 
enforcement and financial crime at the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) explained: “[i]t is a source of some concern to me that firms are 
still not reading across the root causes of misconduct in one area and 
ensuring that the same issues don’t exist in another.”314 Accordingly, 
in both its outer-directed and inner-directed manifestations, the 
representativeness heuristic is likely to limit the deterrent effect of 
regulatory sanctions.  
 
4. Modest Recognition in the United 
Kingdom 
 
 Regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom have revisited 
their enforcement policies in the wake of the 2008 mortgage crisis.315 
In doing so, they have recognized behavioral influences on corporate 
decision-makers.316 
 The FSA and its successors, the FCA and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, have embraced increased penalties as a 
mechanism to deter further breaches of legal standards by wrongdoers 
and deter other persons from committing similar breaches.317 
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However, they have also begun to recognize multiple influences on 
corporate behavior beyond the influence of financial penalties, 
including corporate culture and behavioral influences.318 Thus, the 
FSA acknowledged that rational decision making did not fully and 
accurately predict and determine corporate outcomes.319 It noted: 
 
There are . . . insights from behavioural economics, 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience, which reveal 
that people often do not make decisions in the rational 
front of brain . . . assumed in neoclassical economics, 
but make decisions which are rooted in the instinctive 
part of the brain, and which at the collective level are 
bound to produce herd effects and thus irrational 
momentum swings.”320 
 
Among other cognitive influences recognized is the representativeness 
heuristic, with officials acknowledging that both bankers and 
regulators have “failed to learn the lessons of history,” each time 
saying, “it is different.”321 It remains to be seen whether or how this 
recognition shapes enforcement actions. 
 
IV. Conclusion and Next Step 
 
 Will recent, large financial sanctions, including large civil 
penalties, imposed by U.S. regulators deter future wrongdoing by the 
firms subject to the sanctions and by other firms in the industry? 
Behavioral decision theory and complexity theory advise that there are 
many factors that will influence future corporate assessments and 
decisions on legal compliance.322 Corporate culture influences 
corporate decision making as much as government policies and 
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actions.323 Corporate culture is shaped by internal and external market 
conditions, including cognitive influences, decision-making heuristics, 
and accepted business models that perform cost-benefit evaluations 
with an eye toward maximizing short-term profits.324 Cognitive 
influences and heuristics shape corporate assessments of risk, 
including the risk of legal sanctions for noncompliance.325  
Moreover, nongovernmental and governmental influences are 
dynamic. They change over time—a change that is not identical in 
each firm—and also interact differently within each firm. Whether a 
large fine today will lead to legal compliance next year or years later in 
the same firm, and other firms in the industry, is therefore 
unpredictable. 
 To achieve the goal of deterrence, U.S. regulators must take 
the first step of recognizing the multiple influences on corporate 
decisions, including cognitive influences and heuristics. This is a step 
regulators in the United Kingdom have begun to take.326 In turn, 
regulators need to modify enforcement policies to reflect such multiple 
influences. Regulators must recognize that an increase in monetary 
penalties may not alone lead to consistent or resolute commitment to 
legal compliance. The challenge in the effort to achieve greater legal 
compliance is to determine how to modify enforcement policy to 
reflect the complex, dynamic nature of corporate decisions. The aim is 
to modify enforcement policy in such a manner that cognitive 
influences, including heuristics, incline the corporate actor toward 
greater commitment to corporate compliance.  
One possible change, which could be imposed in addition to 
other sanctions, is an enforcement policy that makes greater use of 
market-based sanctions such as suspensions directed at the 
corporation.327 The suspension might be of a particular product, 
process, or line of business, and would alter the immediate 
assessments of risk. Faced with a business model emphasizing the 
importance of short-term profits and a decision-making heuristic of 
skewed risk perception, suspensions in lines of business, products or 
operations transform profits from primarily a benefit of noncompliance 
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to a significant cost of noncompliance.328 The length of any suspension 
would be uncertain, magnifying the significance of the loss in a cost-
benefit evaluation that embraces cognitive influences.  
Evidence of the effectiveness of this type of sanction is 
provided by the U.S. experience with the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA).329 The CRA, enacted in 1977, requires banking institutions 
to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including low- and 
moderate-income communities.330 The sanction authorized by the Act 
allows the governing agency to deny any “application for a deposit 
facility,” which includes an application to open new branches or to 
merge or acquire the assets of any regulated financial institution.331 
Through 1988, banks largely ignored the CRA’s requirements and 
rarely faced sanction. However, beginning in 1989, and with greater 
frequency during the Clinton administration, the federal banking 
regulators increasingly and with greater consistency denied 
applications for expansion on the part of banking institutions with poor 
CRA ratings.332 This sanction, similar to the sanction of corporate 
suspension, had a direct impact on bank profits. The result was a 
dramatic commitment by banking institutions to CRA lending in a 
market in which banks sought expansion through interstate branching, 
and industry mergers and acquisitions. As of 1985, U.S. banks had 
committed $3.7 billion to CRA lending.333 By 1993, such 
commitments exceeded $30 billion, increased to more than $397 
billion by the first quarter of 1998, and reached $1 trillion in the fall of 
1998.334 This sanction demonstrates the dynamic interaction of 
government action and market forces when risk is assessed by 
corporate actors through a lens subject to cognitive and heuristic 
influence. 
Imposition of corporate product, operations, or line of 
business suspensions for legal violations is a modification in 
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enforcement policy that has been largely rejected by federal regulators 
in the United States,335 although federal regulators have recently 
occasionally utilized this enforcement measure when faced with 
violations of earlier settlements or recidivist behavior.336 It is a change 
in enforcement policy that has been embraced by regulators in the 
United Kingdom,337 and has been imposed by New York State’s 
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financial regulator.338 However, for this enforcement measure to be 
effective, consistency in resort to suspensions is necessary to avoid the 
effects of simplified decision making and the representativeness 
heuristic.  
Consistent resort to suspensions is one of several changes in 
enforcement policy that proper recognition of complexity and 
cognitive influences on corporate behavior may justify. The ideal 
would be to modify enforcement measures in such a manner that they 
interact with the many influences on corporate behavior so as to 
incline the corporate decision maker toward greater commitment to 
legal compliance. How to best accomplish this goal becomes the 
subject of further study. 
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Services imposed a two-year suspension on PricewaterhouseCoopers, a one-
year suspension from consulting work at New York regulated financial 
institutions on Deloitte, and a six-month suspension on Promontory Financial. 
See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Promontory Financial Settles 
with New York Regulator, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/business/dealbook/promontory-
financial-settles-with-new-york-regulator.html [https://perma.cc/KLE8-
PUWT]. 
